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 The aim of this paper is to bring into attention an  interesting  game of accounts manipulation 
and its playes. Their expectations represent the genesis point of manipulative behaviour and by 
understanding their actions  and  gains and losses  we  may  create  a link  to  undestanding  the 
process of creative accounting thinking. The divergent interests of these users (e.g.managers, 
fiscal  authorities  and  banks)  derive  from  their  position  and  power,  and  give  rise  to  doubt 
regarding the objectivity of accountancy information provided by annual financial reports. 
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Introduction  
When and why exactly this concept first appeared and what influenced its development – these 
are questions that come up when opening this true Pandora’s Box: creative accounting. 
With hindsight a few favourable circumstances to this concept can be identified, circumstances 
first related to the economical advent of world states but at the same time to the need of economic 
entities to  create for themselves  a  good  reputation in  an  increasingly  competitive  and tough 
economic  environment.  About  this  particular  moment,  that  is  -  the  first  mention,  regarding 
creative  accounting  practices,  we  can’t  ignore  the  fact  that  the  first  mention  belongs  to  the 
founder of accounting - Luca Paciolo. This ambition of making figures more appealing or the 
opposite, if the case, is as old as 500 years. Thus, Luca Paciolo was shaping in his already 
renowned De Arithmetica, the first accounting manual, practices of creative accounting. 
 In the context of brisk Venetian foreign trade, relationships between traders were recorded by 
double-entry  bookkeeping  with  ink  and  quill-pen  in  main  and  subsidiary  books.  Where 
discrepancies arose, the inkwell was occasionally knocked over on these books – not always 
unintentionally – in order to make the entries illegible. That’s the origin of the term “cover-up”. 
In the context of the world economic crisis nowadays, creative accounting will be referred to 
more often as a field from where it is expected either to offer live-saving solutions or be blamed 
for all the negative evolutions. On this aspect, Salustro and Leburn (quated by Delesalle, 2000) 
would  say:  „Crisis  periods  are  actually  trials  for  enterprises;  affecting  their  cash  flow  and 
generating risks, that accounting doesn’t deal with in a flawless manner. Therefore, managers are 
tempted  to  resort  to  ingenious,  more  often  questionable  procedures,  for  refining  accounts 
presentation.” 
The reality of an enterprise can be mirrored in several aspects, starting from the atmosphere and 
the environment where the employees perform their daily activity, through the company’s brand 
and to the yearly financial statements. This reality, though, seen from the perspective of the 
external environment, capitalized in clients, suppliers, public institutions, banks, investors etc, is 
strongly influenced by the subjectivity of the one watching.  
This approach of the accounting informing system may seem absurd due to the fact that the 
information of the financial statements are some figures, some values which apparently cannot be   814
misunderstood. Yet, reading between the lines and making certain connections, several ways to 
manipulate the information can be discovered.  
 
Actors and their gains and loses in the accounts manipulation game  
In the chess parties there are many times when we consider that one of the parts has an important 
advantage, even though the number of the pieces on the board is the same. To what does this 
statement owe, otherwise a correct one? Obviously, it is explained through the pieces activity 
difference. Seldom, during the moments of maximum confrontation of the pieces on the board, 
one of the parts has more pieces “out of the game”. How can we avoid such situations? Simple, 
taking into account the piece improving principle (according to the Russians, first worded out by 
Makogonov)  who  shows  that:  “in  balanced  position,  when  none  of  the  parts  has  immediate 
threats, it is necessary to rearrange the pieces, in the worst situation, on a suitable field, or if this 
thing is not possible, let’s try to change them.” Of course, there are multiple the situations when 
we have more pieces out of the game. It is necessary the successive application of this principle, 
starting with the strongest pieces. What we have presented above seems something absolutely 
ordinary, we all learn, from first steps on the land of this magical game, that we have “to arrange 
the pieces on the centre of the board, to be stronger”. This does not prevent us, that in the 
moments of relative “calm” on the board, from forgetting about the application of this principle. 
Otherwise, subsequently, this thing becomes already hard or impossible to achieve.  
As within the framework of this “brain” game we can see the ability of the parts to use the pieces 
available to them (by complying more or less with the principle worded) in order to achieve the 
result proposed, thus, by extrapolating our analysis to the case of the enterprises, we can identify 
certain participants who, according to the levers available to them can shape, more or less, the 
image of the enterprise. 
Specialist literature in creative accounting field refers to agency theory, which relates to the 
conflicts of interests between users of accountancy information. 
An  agency  relationship  comes  into  being  when  one  party,  known  as  the  principal,  entrusts 
management of their private assets to another party, known as the agent, who has competence 
and knowledge inaccessible to the principal. The most common form of agency is that in which a 
manager operates on behalf of a shareholder. From this point of view  in the life of an enterprise, 
we can identify two categories of actors having a special position (Feleag￿ N., 2006): 
•  on one side, the shareholders, because their patrimonial rights are not exercised but in the 
end,  after  the  others,  who  have  rights  (creditors,  suppliers,  employees  etc.)  have 
emphasized  their  debts,  the  shareholders  take  the  financial  risk  justifying  the 
appropriation of a part of the year’s profit and from the residual net asset, in the case of 
the entity closing down;   
•  on  the  other  side,  the  leaders,  because  they  have  privileged  information,  taking  into 
account the position held in the enterprise and, therefore, are tempted to take advantage 
by allowing themselves considerable advantages or, generally, by directing the entity 
towards a direction useful for them. In the case of enterprises quoted on financial markets 
there is a natural distribution of responsibilities. Such a distribution and the problems 
arising from it have been presented in the founding papers of Berle and Means (1932). 
The shareholders invest their capitals and give the leaders/managers a mandate through which 
they manage the best the organization, trying to maximize the performance of the enterprise. This 
separation of the responsibility can lead to conflicts generating costs. Manipulating accounting 
data is an activity reserved to company managers, even though the other players in the field 
influence the leaders/  managers  in  their  decision  to perform  such  a  manipulation.  If  it  were 
possible to build a theory of the accounting data management, it would not have started from the 
techniques  used  for  manipulation,  but  based  on  the  needs,  the  occasions  arising  and  of  the 
relations between players and investors.   815 
The conflicts of interest among different interest groups is the real cause of creative accounting. 
Managing  shareholders’  interest  is  to  pay  less  tax  and  dividends.  Investor-shareholders  are 
interested to get more dividends and capital gains. Country’s tax authorities would like to collect 
more and more taxes. Employees are interested to get better salary and higher profit share. But 
creative accounting puts one group or two to advantageous position at the expense of others. One 
day the present authors had an opportunity to have a discussion with the Chief Accountant of an 
enterprise in this regard. The Chief Accountant told, in the course of conversation, that he was 
determined to retain profit for the expansion of his existing unit and establishment of new ones. 
Quite naturally, his interest was to pay less tax and less dividend and, accordingly, to ‘create’ 
financial statements. This type of creative accounting has led David Schiff (1993: 94) to warn 
investors; in general that taking a company’s financial statements at face value can be ``a recipe 
for disaster``. 
The IASC’s framework for the Preparation and presentation of Financial Statements, envisaged 
by  the  IASB,  presents  the  following  categories  of  users:  current  and  potential  investors, 
employees,  creditors,  suppliers,  and  other  commercial  creditors,  clients,  government  and 
governmental institutions and the general public. According to the position of these users relative 
to the business in question, they may be divided in internal and external users. Internal users are 
principally management personnel within the company. They have responsibility for information 
release systems, and therefore have access to supplementary information. External users fall into 
the other categories mentioned in the Framework; according to their authority, they may be able 
to dictate the nature of the information to which they are privy, as is very much the case with 
governmental institutions and banks, while other may be unable to have any say regarding the 
type of information to which they may obtain access, since they lack the necessary authority. 
According to Stolowy and Breton (2004) there are a lot of players in accounts manipulation game  
as we can see in the next scheme: 
Figura 1. Players in the field of accounts 
manipulation
 
Source: Stolowy and Breton (2004) 
Market  Firm  Society 
Investors 
-  Actual 
-  Potential 
(including 
shareholders, 
funders  and 
”buy  side” 
analysts 
Intermediaries 
-  Stockbrokers 
-  Underwriters 
-  ”sell side” 
analysts 
-  Auditors 
-  Managers 
-  Employees 
-  State 




-  Trade unions 
-  Customers 
-  Suppliers 
-  Etc.   816
The investors can be divided in four subgroups: real and potential shareholders and the real and 
potential stockholders. Their interests are very varied and the transfers of riches can be operated 
between these subgroups. Consequently, they react differently to manipulating accounting data.  
Analysts can be grouped into two categories: “buy- side” and “sell-side”. The studies of  Robb 
(1998) and  Kasznik (1999) indicate the  role of financial analysts whose issue recommendation 
and forecasts. According to Breton and Tafler (1995) they normally try to forecast the reported 
numbers including the effects of manipulation. They make profit if a manipulation raises prices, 
and furthermore the issues may be easier to sell.   
Managers may or may not believe in market  efficiency. In case they do not, they can act in order 
to manipulate the numbers. Their purpose would be to reduce the cost of capital, to satisfy the 
external demand of existing shareholders, to increase their own remuneration, to decrease the 
overall risk of the firm, or to avoid violating the debt covenant or incurring political capital costs. 
Concerning the auditors, two contradictory goals can be seen: on the one hand they want to 
satisfy the client and, on the other hand they want to avoid excessive risk from third parties. The 
quality of auditors may also have  an effect on the degree of earnings management. 
Current  investors  (shareholders)  principally  follow  the  progress  of  their  investments,  future 
profitability and the management’s administration and direction of company resources towards 
their individual interests. 
Potential investors follow the likely estimated risk of their future investments, profitability and 
stability of profits over time, and the long term capacity of the business to generate liquidity.  
The public, through the administration of diverse communities, is concerned with the impact of 
the  company’s  activities  upon  local  economic  development,  the  creation  of  new  jobs, 
professional training, contributions to the local budget, and environmental impact. 
There are many forces that influence the accounts and, more particularly, the profit figure. From 
the interests of each group arises the motivation to manage accounting figure. These motivations 
are studied directly and indirectly by many authors. Several have been identified ranging from 
the  managers’  incentives  to  manipulate  earnings  to  the  reasons  of  the  other  stakeholders 
(Merchant ￿i Rockness, 1994). The most important work in this area is the paper written by Watts 
￿i Zimmerman (1986)which proposes a theory for accounting procedure choice containing some 
essential underlying motivations: the remuneration package, debt covenants and political costs. 
Finally,  Dye  (1988)  and  Schipper  (1989),  propose  some  explanations  of  the  manipulating 
behavior of shareholders based on the positive accounting theory. 
Some of these stakeholders groups also have something to lose through accounts manipulation. 
Although, Revsine (1991) sais that everybody wins, that is not always the case. 
 Stolowy (2003) identified, on the one side, the potential gains  of each group in manipulating 
accounts  and  the  potential  loss  for  different  stakeholder  groups  because  of  accounts 
manipulation, on the other side. We can summarize them as follow: 
 
Table 1. Potential gains and losses in/from manipulating accounts 
 
Players   Gains   Losses 
Managers  Reducing the cost of capital 
Keeping their job 
Managing their remuneration 
Respect the debts covenants 
Official examination 
Minimization of income tax 
Gain tax advantages 
Improve  relations  with 
creditors,  employees  and 
investors 
The job and reputation   817 






Increasing the market value of 
their shares 
Controlling employees claims 
Reducing the cost of capital 
Reducing  the  volume  of 
transaction 
Confidence in the market 
Existing bondholders  Increase  the  market  value  of 
their bonds 
Controlling employees claims 
Wealth  transfer  to  the  actual 
shareholders 
Employees  Keeping their jobs 
Increase the remuneration 
Their job from an unexpected 
bankruptcy 
Suppliers  Keeping their client  Some  money  following  an 
unexpected bankruptcy 
Clients  Continuous services 
Warranty respected 
Services interrupted 
Warranties not honored 
State  Tax to collect 
Jobs for people 
No more tax to collect 
Unemployed  people  to 
provide for 
Bankers  Repayment of the loan  Some  money  following  an 
unexpected bankruptcy 
Society  Keeping the job 
Production of wealth 
Jobs lost and resources wasted 
Source: adapted from Stolowy and Breton (2004) 
 
Conclusion 
Even if creative accounting is not against the law, operating  within the letter both of the law and 
of accounting standards, it is quite clearly against the spirit of both. Creative accounting is a 
process of using the rules, the flexibility provided by them and the omissions within them, in 
order to make financial statements look somewhat different from what was intended by the rule. 
The positive image built with the financial statements help will influence decision making both 
internal and external (users of accounting information being including here). 
We can identify a lot of expected rewards earned by those who play this manipulatative game. 
Understanding  the  players  in  the  accounting  field  demands  and  expectations  is  the  key  to 
understand the process of creative accounting. If we were to articulate the process of rational 
reconstruction within the methodological framework that can be used in order to describe the 
process of charecterize the manner in which their expectations can represent the genesis point of 











Source: Elaborated by the authors 
Sometimes the desire reward is an upward move in a firm’s share price. For others, the incentive 
may be a desire to improve debt ratings and reduce interest costs on borrowed amounts, or create 
Define  the  expectations  of  players  in  accounting 
Define  key  assumptions  regarding  their  possible 
actions  
Identify possible directions of action  
Identify and define  possible consequences    818
additional slack and reduce restrictions from debt covenants. Regarding high-profile firms, the 
motivation may be lower political costs, including avoiding more regulation or higher taxes. 
The question that arise as long as we seek in this field is: Can creative accounting be controlled? 
Until we’ll be able to respond on this question based on our researches we come with the answer 
of Sir David Tweedie (quated by McBarnet D, Whelan C, 1999) when was asked whether the 
new regim will win the battle against creative accounting. His respond was memorable: “ We’re 
like a cross-eyed javelin thrower competing at the Olympic Games: we may not win but we’ll 
keep the crowd on the edge of its seats!” 
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